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NO. 45 NOVEMBER 2019 Introduction 
International Schemes, Libyan Realities 
Attempts at Appeasing Khalifa Haftar Risk Further Escalating Libya’s Civil War 
Wolfram Lacher 
Almost eight months into the offensive on Tripoli by Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan Arab 
Armed Forces” (LAAF), the war shows no signs of abating. Ongoing diplomatic efforts 
are divorced from realities on the ground. The current balance of forces rules out any 
possibility for a return to a political process. This would require either robust inter-
national guarantees or a fragmentation of both opposing camps. As long as Haftar 
has the chance to advance in Tripoli, he and his foreign supporters will view negotia-
tions as a tactic to divide his opponents and move closer to seizing power. To create 
the conditions for negotiations, Western states should work to weaken Haftar’s 
alliance – and ultimately to prepare the post-Haftar era. 
 
After the first few days of the offensive in 
April, Haftar’s forces for months made no 
more territorial gains in Tripoli. Nor were 
Haftar’s adversaries – an alliance of armed 
groups from western Libyan cities that go 
back to the 2011 war against Qadhafi – 
able to repel the attackers. The recapture 
of Gharyan in late June 2019 was the last 
major success of the anti-Haftar forces. 
Since he lost Gharyan, Haftar has been rely-
ing solely on Tarhuna as the base for his 
ground offensive. The militia of the Kani 
brothers in that city has come to play a 
central role in Haftar’s alliance. 
As the war has dragged on, foreign mili-
tary support has become ever more impor-
tant for both sides. At the same time, inhi-
bitions towards causing civilian casualties 
have steadily fallen. In mid-April, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) started using 
combat drones in support of Haftar. His 
adversaries pulled even in mid-May by ob-
taining combat drones from Turkey. Since 
late June, UAE fighter jets have also repeat-
edly bombed Haftar’s opponents. The UAE 
gradually established air superiority; Turk-
ish drones have largely stopped operating. 
Despite this, Haftar has made little pro-
gress because he has been unable to mobi-
lise greater numbers of determined Libyan 
fighters. His forces include units he built up 
during recent years in eastern Libya as well 
as western Libyan armed groups, whose loy-
alty to Haftar is often doubtful. Among them, 
hardline Salafis and former supporters of the 
Qadhafi regime form prominent subgroups. 
To boost his forces, Haftar has deployed 
ever more Chadian and Sudanese fighters – 
but most importantly the mercenaries of 
the Russian private military company Wag-
ner, who arrived in Tripoli in September, 
and by mid-November numbered well over 
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1,000 men. Only with this Russian contin-
gent, which was undoubtedly approved by 
the Kremlin, was Haftar able to regain the 
offensive during November. But his modest 
advances came at the cost of US permissive-
ness towards Haftar’s offensive. Alarmed 
over the Russian mercenaries, the United 
States called on Haftar to end his offensive. 
It remains unclear whether further steps 
will follow that call. 
The long stalemate caused war fatigue 
among armed groups on both sides. Haf-
tar’s increasing reliance on foreign merce-
naries is a case in point. Among his adver-
saries, there are growing accusations that 
the Government of National Accord (GNA) 
in Tripoli lacks determination in the fight 
against Haftar, is failing to mobilise the 
needed weaponry from abroad, and that 
many of its members are busy with self-
enrichment, or even complicit with Haftar. 
Mobilisation for the defence of Tripoli 
has declined in recent months. Since the 
frontlines had not seen any real changes 
in months, many no longer saw the 
urgency of the situation. Major advances 
by Haftar would likely prompt renewed 
mobilisation. 
War of Attrition 
As the stalemate persists, each side hopes 
that the opposing camp will fragment at 
some point. These hopes are not entirely 
baseless, but they are often misplaced. 
Haftar is waging a war of attrition 
against his opponents, with generous for-
eign support: The Chinese-made Emirati 
drones are clearly superior to the Turkish 
model, and the Russian air-defence bat-
teries provided by the UAE give Haftar’s 
bases an important advantage. Haftar is 
seeking to slowly degrade his adversaries’ 
capabilities with relentless airstrikes. This 
assumes, however, that the Tripoli govern-
ment will not get better at replacing de-
stroyed weapons and vehicles. 
Haftar and his foreign backers also ex-
pect that some militia leaders in the enemy 
camp may soon switch sides. In fact, this 
has been unlikely since the beginning of the 
war: Defectors cannot trust Haftar to keep 
any promises he makes now, once he has 
won. 
It is true that Haftar’s enemies are only 
united by the threat he poses to them. There 
are real tensions between some of the com-
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ponent elements in the anti-Haftar alliance. 
Past conflicts and expectations of future 
rivalries fuel distrust between them, but the 
opportunism of these forces is often over-
estimated. Most commanders and fighters 
not only firmly believe that they are fight-
ing for a just cause: against the establishment 
of dictatorship by force. Many of them are 
also deeply rooted in the social fabric of par-
ticular cities and are convinced that they 
are defending their families and communi-
ties. If they lose the war against Haftar, they 
will have to flee abroad. It is therefore un-
likely that Haftar’s opponents will give in 
easily. 
The forces fighting Haftar are placing 
their hopes in ceasefire negotiations with 
militias from Tarhuna that would sideline 
Haftar. This idea does not lack plausibility: 
Local ceasefires also ended the last civil 
war, in 2015. The Kani brothers’ militia 
only joined Haftar’s alliance with the start 
of his Tripoli offensive and had previously 
been opportunistic in the choice of its 
allies. Contacts between forces in the anti-
Haftar camp and representatives of Tar-
huna have never broken off; attempts at 
negotiations continue. But for these to pro-
gress, two conditions would need to hold: 
First, Haftar would need to suffer reversals 
that would increase pressure on Tarhuna – 
which is currently not the case. Second, 
Haftar’s opponents would need to guaran-
tee that they will not try capturing the city 
once it has broken with Haftar. This would 
require the deployment of units that enjoy 
respect on both sides. 
The Berlin Process 
In September 2019, UN Special Representa-
tive Ghassan Salamé and the German gov-
ernment launched the Berlin process, a 
series of consultations between the five per-
manent members of the UN Security Coun-
cil and the states intervening in Libya. The 
initial aim was to hold a high-level confer-
ence at which these states would commit 
to discontinue their support to the warring 
parties and respect the arms embargo. This 
was to create the conditions for a ceasefire 
and a return to a Libyan political process. 
However, among Haftar’s foreign sup-
porters, Egypt, France, and the UAE pushed 
to expand the agenda beyond the issue of 
foreign meddling to include the outlines 
of an intra-Libyan settlement. Suspending 
UAE drone strikes while fighting continues 
on the ground would probably lead to Haf-
tar’s defeat. These states therefore cannot 
trust that an end to foreign meddling would 
lead to a negotiated settlement favourable 
to them. As a result, the discussions have 
come to include ceasefire arrangements, the 
contours of a political process, and certain 
“reforms” that Haftar’s backers see as part 
of a settlement. These notably include 
easier access to Central Bank resources for 
Haftar – through the restoration of the 
board of governors of the Central Bank and 
its absorption of debt accumulated in east-
ern Libya over recent years – and the 
demobilisation of “militias”, by which 
Haftar’s supporters only mean those of 
his adversaries. 
The international alignments reflected in 
the Berlin process mean that Haftar’s oppo-
nents would need to make major conces-
sions in exchange for a ceasefire. At the 
same time, Haftar’s forces would remain 
in greater Tripoli – if only because militias 
from nearby Tarhuna are there anyway. 
Such ideas are incompatible with the 
options open to Haftar’s opponents – who, 
like other Libyan parties, are not partici-
pating in the Berlin talks. The anti-Haftar 
alliance is fragile and lacks strong political 
leadership. Should some of its representa-
tives accept an unconditional ceasefire – let 
alone more wide-ranging concessions – the 
alliance would splinter into proponents and 
opponents of such a deal. Latent distrust 
would turn into open enmity. The fragmen-
tation of his opponents would allow Haftar 
to move forward militarily and persuade 
some of his enemies to switch sides. Under 
current circumstances, talks with Haftar 
would therefore be fatal for his opponents – 
and they are acutely aware of this danger. 
The launch of the Berlin Process was 
based on the assumption that, after months 
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of war, Haftar’s foreign backers had con-
cluded that a military victory was unrealis-
tic, and they would therefore be ready to 
negotiate. This assumption was wrong, as 
shown not only by the arrival of Russian 
mercenaries since September. France, Egypt, 
and the UAE also appear to view negotia-
tions merely as a step towards Haftar’s cap-
ture of power. There is no reason to believe 
that these states have now abandoned their 
longstanding goal of empowering Haftar. 
If a minority among the forces fighting 
Haftar were to agree to a ceasefire and 
negotiations, this would not bring about 
an end to the conflict. Rather, it would risk 
ushering in a much more violent phase 
of the war. Haftar could exploit tensions 
among his opponents to advance into 
densely populated neighbourhoods of Tri-
poli. There, the conflict could take a much 
higher toll on civilians. If Haftar actually 
ends up taking control of Tripoli – after 
months or perhaps years of fighting, which 
would cause major destruction – he will 
not yet have captured the cities that form 
the strongholds of his opponents: Misrata, 
Zawiya, and the Amazigh towns. Yearnings 
for revenge against these communities are 
widespread in his alliance. Attempts to sub-
jugate these cities would certainly see war 
crimes and arbitrary repression. 
Alternatives 
A political solution will only become imagi-
nable once Haftar no longer has the pos-
sibility of using negotiations to exploit rifts 
among his opponents for military gains. 
There are two conditions that could prevent 
him from doing so. First, the United States 
and European states offer robust guarantees 
that they will prevent Haftar from violating 
a ceasefire. This would require much more 
than words, as the United States, the EU, and 
the UN lost most of their remaining cred-
ibility in Libya when they failed to react to 
Haftar’s offensive. Merely supervising the 
ceasefire with civilian observers and aerial 
photography would fail entirely to offer 
security. But a peacekeeping mission is 
currently not on the table. 
The second possible condition would 
be that Haftar’s alliance fragments as well, 
removing the threat of a renewed offensive 
following negotiations. This could happen 
as a result of military reversals and local 
negotiations in western Libya, or if his for-
eign backers change course – by diversi-
fying their Libyan clients, or in response 
to increased Western pressure. The United 
States would certainly need to play a key 
role in this regard, particularly to contain 
Russian influence. That said, the current 
administration will hardly pursue a predict-
able and consistent Libya policy. 
But Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and other European states could also exert 
more influence than they have done to 
date – by engaging more intensively with 
France. French political backing for Haf-
tar’s war clearly harms European interests. 
France’s European partners have rarely 
addressed this issue openly, and there has 
been little public debate about it in France. 
This is largely due to the discretion with 
which the French government has pursued 
its line since French weapons were found in 
Haftar’s Gharyan base in June 2019, briefly 
raising eyebrows. Opening up a debate on 
this policy would force the French govern-
ment to explain its position. The aim should 
be a unified European approach towards 
Haftar’s foreign supporters. 
A fragmentation of Haftar’s alliance 
could also weaken his authority in the east 
and cause renewed instability there. But 
given that Haftar is 76 years old and report-
edly ill, this is a likely scenario anyway. For 
now, the personality cult surrounding Haf-
tar and the repressive apparatus run by his 
inner circle hold the conflicting interests in 
his eastern alliance together. But Haftar’s 
departure could at any moment provoke a 
scramble to fill the vacuum. Preparing the 
post-Haftar era would be a more sensible 
realpolitik than helping to empower him by 
watching the current war to its bitter end. 
Dr. Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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